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FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw-FRAUD--SUPREME
OF THE BIRNBAUM RULE-Blue

COURT AFFIRMATION

Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,

421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Pursuant to an antitrust consent decree, 1 control of defendant Blue
Chip Stamp Company was to be distributed more equitably among
companies that used its stamps through a special securities offering
whereby retail users could purchase the company's stock on a pro rata
basis. Many of the retailers, however, declined to purchase such
shares. Two years later, plaintiff retailer, which had been an offeree in
the special sale but had not purchased, filed a class action under Section 10(b)2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and Securities and
Exchange Commission rule lOb-5. 4 Plaintiff claimed that defendant,
through use of a misleading prospectus, 5 had fraudulently dissuaded it
from purchasing its entitlement of the stock in what was to have been
a bargain offering. Defendant had subsequently changed the prospectus and sold the stock, to the public at a price greatly in excess of
the price under the special offering. The federal district court dismissed the claim, finding under the rule of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.6 that plaintiff was neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities
and thus did not have standing to bring the action. 7 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that an exception
1. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp .Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
affd sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968)

(mem.) Defendant Blue Chip Stamps had a virtual monopoly in the distribution of
"bonus" stamps incidental to retail purchases in California. The United States Govern-

ment sued to diversify control of the company. Neither plaintiff nor any other member
of its class was a party to the antitrust consent decree.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
3. Ch. 404, tit. 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). See note 12 and accompanying text infra.
5. The prospectus included under the heading "Items of Special Interest" the statements that (1) suits claiming a total of $29 million were presently pending against the

company; (2) the company expected an unprecedented 97.5% of all stamps issued to
be ultimately redeemed; and (3) the company expected net earnings to be considerably
down due to the sale of a third of the company's business in southern California. The
outstanding claims were later settled for less than $1 million, and only 90% of the
stamps were redeemed (approximately the percentage of stamps which had usually been
redeemed in previous years). One year later, when the defendants sold stock in a public offering, these new facts were noted, and no mention was made of other adverse

considerations which had been listed in the prospectus issued to plaintiff. Brief for
Petitioner at 56, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
6. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
7. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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to that rule should be made in this case since the offer of stock had
been mandated by an antitrust consent decree. 8 On writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed. Held: The purchaser-seller requirement of rule
lOb-5 announced in Birnbaum is justified both on grounds of statutory interpretation and policy; since plaintiff did not come within the
ambit of the rule, it had no standing to maintain the action. Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
This note will examine the historical background and development
of the Birnbaum rule and will consider the Supreme Court's reasoning
in its first examination of that rule. Taking the position that the Birnbaum rule is generally a useful one, this note nevertheless suggests that
the rule should be applied more flexibly in the future in order to
achieve its twin objectives of admitting valid claims and excluding
nuisance suits. Particularly questioned will be the Court's failure to
delineate and consider separately the validity of the substantive portion of the Birnbaum rule; the Court's wholehearted acceptance of the
rule, which casts doubt upon most of its exceptions; and the fact that
many deserving plaintiffs will be foreclosed from maintaining lOb-5
actions by the Court's position in Blue Chip.
I.
A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIRNBAUM
The Rule JOb-5 Action

Following the 1929 stock market crash, the New Deal Congress
passed the Securities Act of 19339 and the Securities Exchange Act of
193410 in an attempt to curb some of the fraudulent and misleading
practices that had ruined many investors. Section 10(b) of the Act of
1934 makes it unlawful to use, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security, a manipulative or deceptive device, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) may prescribe." In 1942, acting under the au8. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973).
9. Ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
10. Ch. 404, tit. 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
1I.
Section 10(b) of the Act of 1934 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . ..

[t] o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
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thority of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the SEC promulgated rule
lOb-5. The rule makes it unlawful for any person (a) to employ any
device to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of material fact
or omit any material fact, or (c) to engage in any act which operates
as a fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any
2
security.'
There is no indication that Congress had any intention of creating a
private civil remedy by the passage of Section 10(b) of the Act of
1934.13 Nor is there any indication that the SEC intended to create a
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
13. Virtually the only comment on enforcement of the 1934 Act by the reporting
committee was: "The committee considers that the act could be administered effectively by a Commission of five, to be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, specifically for that purpose." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1934). The commentators have been unable to find any explicit authorization
of such action by Congress and have only been able to argue the implications which
can be drawn from other parts of the Act. See, e.g., 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD §§ 2.2(330)-(340) (1975); Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 858, 860 (1948).
Since Blue Chip, the Court has held that the private cause of action is well-established. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1382 (1976)..Ernst & Ernst was an
accounting firm which had audited the records of a Chicago brokerage firm and prepared the annual reports of the brokerage for the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) as required by 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970). The president of the firm defrauded
plaintiffs by inducing them to invest in some "escrow accounts," the funds of which he
appropriated for his own use. The scheme was made possible, at least in part, by the
president's mail rule which forbade any employee of the brokerage from opening the
president's mail (plaintiffs invested directly with the president and addressed their mail
to him). The president committed suicide and the brokerage was bankrupt, so plaintiffs sued Ernst & Ernst under rule lob-5 for negligently aiding and abetting the fraudulent scheme by failing to question the president's mail rule in the course of its audits.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, holding that plaintiffs stated a cause of action under
rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court, in a 6-2 opinion by Justice Powell, reversed, holding
that plaintiffs must plead and prove scienter on the part of defendants to prevail under
rule lOb-5. Justices Blackmun and Brennan dissented, finding negligence to be a sufficient basis for a claim under lOb-5.
The Court's holding in Ernst was much broader than was necessary to decide the
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right of private action under its rule. 14 Nevertheless, four years after
the promulgation of the rule, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,1 5 a
district court held that there was an implied private right of action
under the rule. The Supreme Court finally confirmed the existence of
such an action in 1971, when it adopted the view expressed by the
overwhelming number of federal courts in Superintendent of Insur6
ance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.1

B.

The Purchaser-SellerLimitation

Since both Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 proscribe fraudulent practices only "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp. t7 concluded that procedurally a plaintiff has standing to
sue only if he has actually purchased or sold securities; and that substantively the essence of the claim must be securities fraud and not
internal corporate mismanagement. 1 8 In Birnbaum plaintiff was a
case. The Court was presented only with the issue of whether negligence is a sufficient
basis for liability for aiding and abetting lOb-5 fraud. The majority, however, held
that scienter was a requirement for all lOb-5 actions for damages. The Court did.
however, reserve the questions of whether recklessness is sufficient to constitute scienter and whether scienter is a requirement for injunctive relief. 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n. 12.
14. The news release distributed by the SEC at the time of the promulgation of
rule lOb-5 merely indicates that the rule was designed to plug a loophole in the
SEC's enforcement powers. See SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No.
3230 (May 21,

1942), in 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD app. B (1975).

Some of the SEC participants in the promulgation of the rule later described the
almost haphazard way in which it came about. Comments by Milton Freeman to
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, Nov. 18-19, 1966, in 22
Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967). Courts and commentators have been unable to find any
explicit indication that the SEC contemplated the creation of a private remedy.
See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952); 3
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1469 n.87 (1961).

15. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
16. 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
17. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
18. The basis of the substantive rule in Birnbaum was the court's belief that Congress' only intent in passing the securities acts was to provide relief from fraud growing
out of misrepresentation in the issuance and exchange of securities. The Birnbaum
court did not believe that Congress meant to reach breach of fiduciary duties by directors and officers of the corporation. Adequate relief for breach of fiduciary duty was
considered available to shareholders under state law. Breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation in a securities transaction are not mutually exclusive categories. The
Birnbaum court, however, understood § 10(b) to require that the essence of plaintiffs claim be misrepresentation in a securities transaction.
A recent case demonstrating such a concern with the nature of the fraud alleged is
Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), where the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of plaintiff's lOb-5 claim because plaintiff admit-
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minority stockholder in the Newport Steel Corporation. The president
of Newport had rejected an attractive merger plan with another steel
company in order to sell his controlling shares of Newport stock at
double their market value to a group of manufacturers who wanted
Newport as a captive source of steel during a temporary steel shortage. Plaintiffs shares declined sharply in value as the result of the
president's questionable action, and he brought suit to recover his
losses. The court concluded that Section 10(b) "was directed solely at
that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent
mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that Rule X-10B-5 [rule
lOb-5] extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or
seller." 19
The procedural requirements of the Birnbaum rule have subsequently been adopted by most of the circuit courts;2 0 it has only recently been rejected by a court of appeals. 21 The substantive requirement of the rule has rarely been specifically addressed, 22 but where it
ted that defendants had made a full and fair disclosure of the facts. The court found
that the remedy for plaintiff's claim that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty
to the minority shareholders in arranging a merger lay in state court. The court did
note that relief would not be denied under 1Ob-5 where plaintiff merely alleges that
the misconduct complained of "really amounts to just corporate mismanagement," 464
F.2d at 718, but it found that rule lOb-5 was designed to impose a duty to disclose
and inform and that no action would lie under the rule absent a violation of that duty.
But see Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976) (Section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 held to prevent merger where all facts were disclosed to minority shareholders). Marshel was distinguished from Popkin in that corporate funds were used to
finance the merger in Marshel.This distinction, however, fails to explain plaintiffs' failure to allege the nondisclosure needed to state a lob-5 claim.
19. 193 F.2dat 464.
20. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been joined by the courts for
the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., Landy v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1970); Simmons v. Wolfson,
428 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971); City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 227-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970);
Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Jensen v. Voyles,
393 F.2d 131, 133 (10th Cir. 1967). The First, Fourth, and District of Columbia circuit courts have not been presented with the issue.
21. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). The court accepted the substantive aspect of the
rule but rejected the procedural standing requirement. Plaintiffs guaranteed notes assumed by corporation when it bought a business by issuing 7,000 shares of its stock
to the previous owners. Although such a transfer of stock amounted to a sale under
the Act, plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers; but Judge (now Justice) Stevens
found that the claim was for securities fraud covered by the Act and remanded for
trial.
22. See text accompanying notes 70-77 infra.
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has, it has been greatly liberalized.2 3 Such liberalization seems to have
been the intent of the New Deal Congress, which desired that the
broadest possible scope be given the law in order to make the stock
exchanges calm, serious, and honest marketplaces for securities. This
intention is manifest in the records of the hearings and debates on the
24
acts.
Similarly, many exceptions to the standing rule have been fashioned by the courts over the past 23 years. 25 For example, where
plaintiff has been injured by a fraudulent practice connected with use
of the securities market, and he is at least arguably a purchaser or
seller, the courts have often been willing to find that he is within the
Birnbaum rule. 26 Thus, in some cases plaintiffs have been deemed
23. See Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REV. 543
(1971); Note, Standing To Sue in lob-5 Actions: Eason v. GMAC and Its Impact on
the Birnbaum Doctrine,49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1131 (1974). Several writers have taken
the view that the substantive holding has been liberalized out of existence. In their
view, the courts will require only the most tenuous showing of the use of securities in
the fraud, in order to bring a lOb-5 action, regardless of whether the essence of the
scheme amounts to breach of a corporate fiduciary duty or misrepresentation in a
securities transaction. See note 18 supra. Thus, they reject the idea that misrepresentation in a securities transaction is still a significant requirement of such an action. I A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.7 (1975); Comment, Dumping Birnbaum To
Force Analysis Of The Standing Requirement Under Rule lOb-5, 6 LOYOLA U. CHI.
L.J. 230 (1975).
Contrary to this view is Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), in which
the court held that rule lOb-5 still requires an allegation of misrepresentation. For
fuller discussion, see note 18 supra.
24. As noted in H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933):
Any objection that the compulsory incorporation in selling literature and sales
argument of substantially all information concerning the issue, will frighten the
buyer with the intricacy of the transaction, states one of the best arguments for
the provision.
Senator Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, described the function of the section which became § 10(b) of the Act: "The Commission is also given power to forbid any other devices in connection with security transactions which it finds detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of
investors." 78 CONG. REC. 2271 (1934).
Such a wide role for lob-5 was not found by the Court, however, in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976). See note 13 supra. Justice Powell refuted the
argument of the SEC in its amicus brief that the securities laws were remedial legislation and therefore should be broadly and liberally interpreted, by reading each section
of the acts as carefully drafted by Congress to remedy specific injuries. He found that
each section also included specific procedural and substantive limitations upon the
actions which should be closely observed as part of the overall congressional scheme.
96 S. Ct. at 1384, 1388-89.
25. See I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.7 (1975); Boone & McGowan,
Standing To Sue Under SEC Ride 10b-5, 49 TEX. L. REV. 617 (1971); Whitaker, The
Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REV. 543 (1971).
26. The courts have never declared that any of their holdings constitute exceptions
to the Birnbaumn rule. Nevertheless, they have so tortured the rule so as to find plaintiffs' cases within it, that the holdings are perhaps best regarded as exceptions. I A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.7 (1975); Fuller, Another Demise of the Birnbaun Doctrine: "Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?", 25 MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1970);
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"forced sellers. '27 In other cases where several purchases and sales (either actual or contemplated) were involved, courts have held that
plaintiffs could assert standing to challenge as fraudulent transactions
other than those that actually caused their injuries, 28 while suits in
29
equity have been exempted from the standing requirement altogether.
Additionally, through the use of a stockholder's derivative action, a
plaintiff who has merely held shares in a corporation may claim relief
on behalf of all those stockholders who have been adversely affected

by fraud in any transaction in which the corporation has bought or
sold securities. 30
Note, Standing To Sue in 10b-5 Actions: Eason v. GMAC and Its Impact on the Birnbaum Doctrine, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 1131 (1974); Note, 7 ST. MARY'S LJ. 602
(1975).
27. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967). Plaintiff owned some class A stock, which made up over 90% of the
stock issued but elected only a third of the board of directors of Crown Finance Co.
Defendant purchased all the class B.stock, which elected the remaining directors, at a
premium and used its control of the board to force a short form merger of Crown into
Beneficial. This presented plaintiff with the option of either selling his shares at a discount or continuing to hold shares in a nonexistent corporation. The court found that
plaintiff was a "forced seller," though at the time of the filing of his action, he had not
sold his stock. The court also found that he could not be a seller by bringing a stockholder's derivative action because Crown Finance no longer existed. See also Crane Co.
v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969) (Crane's tender offer
for Westinghouse was defeated through market manipulation, leaving Crane with 32%
of the shares in Westinghouse which it had to sell for antitrust reasons).
28. See, e.g., Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Plaintiffs were dissuaded by the misrepresentations of defendant broker from selling
their stock. After discovering the fraud, they sold the stocks at a loss and brought suit.
The court found that they had standing to sue as sellers, despite the fact that their true
injury arose from their earlier failure to sell. See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 405 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), the broad language of the Supreme Court
suggesting that it, too, would allow the standing requirement to be met by a transaction other than the one which caused plaintiff's damages.
29. See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
Controlling shareholders manipulated the price of stock and kept dividends to a minimum in order to induce the minority shareholders to sell at a reduced price. Nonselling minority stockholders did not have standing under Birnbaum to bring an action
for damages, but the court held that they could seek injunctive relief against further
market manipulation. The court, quoting from SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963), stated: "'It is not necessary in a suit for equitable
or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary
damages."' 384 F.2d at 547. In Capital Gains, the Supreme Court had further noted
that to require proof of intent to injure and actual injury to clients would defeat the
intent of Congress by empowering the courts to enjoin any practice that operates as a
fraud or deceit. 375 U.S. at 195. But see Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d
783 (8th Cir. 1967) (court dismissed claim because plaintiffs had not purchased or
sold the securities involved in the alleged, fraud); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc.,
No. 75-2253 (3d Cir., Aug. 13, 1976) (exception limited to prevention of future
fraud, inapplicable to actions seeking mere rescission of an allegedly fraudulent
transaction).
30. In such an action plaintiff stands in the shoes of the corporation, and thus it is
the corporation which must be a purchaser or a seller. Plaintiff shareholder generally
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Since the inception of the Birnbaum rule, the SEC has repeatedly
attempted its overthrow. Regarding Birnbaum as unduly restrictive of
valid private actions, the SEC has twice attempted to have Congress
change the wording of the statute 3 ' and has often filed amicus briefs
32
urging the demise of Birnbaum in cases challenging the rule. Most
commentators, too, have disapproved of the purchaser-seller limitation as an extremely arbitrary rule which bars many plaintiffs who
deserve relief.3 3 In fact, several have viewed some of the circuit
courts' opinions broadening Birnbaum as effecting a complete elimination of the rule.3 4 Some writers, however, have deemed the creation
of exceptions to the standing rule as a natural part of its growth and
development. 35 The substantive requirement has drawn little criticism,
as its early liberal interpretation has made it an obstacle to few, if any,
actions.3 6 Despite the exceptions and regardless of comments, Birn37
baum has remained the nearly universal rule for 23 years.
obtains no individual recovery; damages go to the defrauded corporation. See Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Berger, "Disregardingthe Corporate
Entity" for Stockholders' Benefit, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1955). See also H. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

§§

358-

373 (2d ed. 1970); 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.7 (1975).
3 1. In 1957 and again in 1959 the SEC sought to add the words "or any attempt
to purchase or sell" to the statute. See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 732, citing 103 CONG.
REC. 11636 (1957), Hearings on S. 1178-1182 Before a Subcoinm. of the Senate
Coinm. on Banking & Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1959), S. 2545, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), and S. 1179, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
32. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 630, 636 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 395 (2d Cir.
1967). The SEC filed such briefs in all stages of Blue Chip as well.
33.
1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.7 (1975); Lowenfels, The De
raise of the Birnbaum doctrine: A New Erafor Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968);
Comment, The Purchaser-SellerRequirement of Rule 10b-5 Reevaluated. 44 COLO. L.
REV. 151 (1972).
34. The demise of the purchaser-seller limitation has been viewed as desirable in
order to achieve the flexible enforcement of the securities acts necessary to deal with
the ingenuity of potential wrongdoers in today's complicated securities markets. See,
e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of tile Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5,
54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968). Lowenfels based his conclusion on the opinions in Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). see
note 27 supra, and A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), see note
90 infra. See also Fuller, Another Demise of the Birnbaun Doctrine: "Tolls the Knell
of Parting Day?", 25 MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1970); Comment, Dunping Birnbaum To
Force Analysis Of The Standing Requirement Under Rule lOb-5, 6 LOYOLA U. CHI.
L.J. 230 (1975).
35. For a particularly illuminating discussion along these lines, see Boone & McGowan, Standing To Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEX. L. REV. 617 (1971);
Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REV. 543 (197 1).
36. See note 23 supra.
37. "Birnbanm has been shot at by expert marksmen.... Bloody but unbowed.
Birnbaum still stands." Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
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II.

THE DECISION IN BLUE CHIP

A.

The Majority's Position:Plain Meaning Revived

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores was the first case to present
the issue of the validity of the Birnbaum rule to the Supreme Court.
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion upheld the. rule both upon legislative history and intent as well as upon policy grounds. He found that
"[t] he longstanding acceptance [of the rule] by the courts, coupled
with Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum's reasonable interpretation
of the wording of § 10 (b) ...argues significantly in favor of accept'38
ance of the Birnbaum rule by this Court.
The opinion considered the plain meaning of the statute3 9 to require that plaintiff be a purchaser or a seller of securities. It further
noted that when Congress wished to provide a private remedy it had
no difficulty in finding language to make its wishes clear, citing Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act 40 as an example. 41 Implicit in this observation seems to be the idea that since it is not even clear that Congress
intended a private remedy in the first place, the Court is under no
compulsion to extend standing to a broader class of plaintiffs. 42 Further support for the Birnbaum rule was found in Section 28(a) of the
1934 Act, 43 which limits recovery in any private action brought under
the 1934 Act to "actual damages." The Court noted that while such
damages are easily determined where plaintiff has actually purchased
or sold securities, they become largely conjectural and speculative
where he has not. 44 Finally the opinion observes that the principal
express nonderivative private civil remedies in the acts of 1933 and
1934 created by Congress contemporaneously with Section 10(b) are
by their terms expressly limited to the purchasers or sellers of securities. 4 5
38.
39.

421 U.S. at 733.
See text accompanying note 11 supra.

40.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).

41.

421 U.S. at 734.

42. The continued validity of the argument against a private remedy is doubtful in
light of the Court's recent flat statement that "[a] Ithough.§ 10(b) does not by its
terms create an express civil remedy for its violation .... the existence of a private
cause of action for violations of the statute and the rule is now well established."
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1382 (1976).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
44.

Accord, 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAUD § 8.8 (1975).

45.

Section Il(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970), limits the right to

"any person acquiring [the] security," while § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970), limits the

1033

Washington Law Review

Vol. 51: 1025, 1976

The Court conceded, however, that the growth of the law in this
area has been so great that it is impossible to determine completely the
contours of Section 10(b) by the actions of Congress. 46 Consequently,
Justice Rehnquist turned to the policy questions involved. 4 7 Recognizing that the purchaser-seller limitation sometimes excludes plaintiffs with valid claims, the Court found that this disadvantage was
outweighed by the advantages of the rule.
First, Justice Rehnquist found that even a complaint which by
objective standards has very little chance of prevailing upon the merits
has a settlement value out of proportion to its chances of success, if
the plaintiff can avoid dismissal or summary judgment. Since the very
pendency of a lawsuit can make credit difficult to obtain or halt
normal business operations, settlements are virtually compelled in
order for the defendant to survive financially. 4 8 The possibility for
abuse of the liberal federal discovery rules exists as well. The threat of
extensive depositions and discovery of defendant's business records
can have considerable settlement value. The Court found that the
elimination of the Birnbaum rule would lead to substantially more
such nuisance, or "strike," suits, by which money would be extorted
from corporations which had done nothing more than be too gloomy
49
in their prospectuses.
Secondly, the majority feared that the elimination of Birnbaum
would allow the maintenance of many actions which would turn
upon hazy issues of fact, resolvable solely by the testimony of the
allegedly injured party. If Birnbaum were followed, the majority observed, the plaintiffs would at least have dealt in the security involved
remedy to the "person purchasing [the] security." Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970), confines the remedy for its violation to "any person who shall
purchase or sell any security." Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1970), limits its remedy to "any person . . . who . . . shall have purchased or sold a

security at a price which was affected by such statement."
46. In notable contrast with Justice Rehnquist's Blue Chip opinion, Justice Powell's majority opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1385-89 (1976).
was well able to determine the limits of the section in light of the overall congressional
scheme.
47. 421 U.S. at 737.
48. Bromberg suggests that once a case in this area has survived all motions for
dismissal and for summary judgment, it is almost always settled before trial. 3 A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 9.1 (1975).
49. In most circumstances this fear is unjustified, as the issuer does not stand to
profit by discouraging purchase of its securities. Thus, gloominess is generally good
faith conservatism in the prospectus. In Blue Chip, however, where the sale was pursuant to an antitrust consent decree, defendants stood to gain by discouraging purchases.
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and therefore would have a record of the transaction. This would
present far less of an evidentiary problem than where plaintiffs had
no record of a transaction. Such a record would at least demonstrate
the timing and the quantity of securities involved in the purchase or
sale at issue.
The Court noted that the court of appeals had not overruled Birnbaum but had found only that plaintiff's status as an offeree pursuant to an antitrust decree served the same function, by limiting the
class of plaintiffs, as is normally served by a contractural relationship.50 There is a clear line of authority, however, holding that a consent decree is not enforceable by those not parties to it, even though
they may be beneficiaries of the decree. 51 Thus, Manor Drugs could
not enforce the consent decree and had no contractual right to the
securities. The Court found this to be in sharp contrast with the situation where plaintiff has such contractual rights, as "contract rights"
are expressly included in "purchase" and "sale" under Section 3(a) of
52
the 1934 Act.
B.

The Dissent: Relief to Deserving Plaintiffs Denied

Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented, 53 believing that the Birnbaum rule should be eliminated.
Finding the rule to be arbitrary and accusing the Court of a "preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being and a seeming callousness
toward the investing public quite out of keeping . . . [with the

50. The definitions of "purchase" and "sale" in §§ 3(a)(13)-(14) of the 1934 Act
explicitly include contracts to buy and sell. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13)-(14) (1970).

51. In United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971), the Court held that
the Government could not enforce what it regarded as the "purpose" of an antitrust
consent decree upon a nonparty, because such a decree has no binding force except as

to issues settled in it between the parties, and that parties give up their due process

right to a trial in return for such limitation of the effect of the decree. See Buckeye
Coal & Ry. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 269 U.S. 42 (1925) (outsider Buckeye was unable

to sue to enforce an antitrust consent decree between Hocking and the federal government in order to separate ownership of railroads and coalfields).
52.

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)-(14) (1970).

53. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, filed a concurring opinion emphasizing the significance of the acts of 1933 and 1934 and particularly the
language of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. He specifically noted the absence of "offer to sell"

from the definitions of "purchase" and "sale" in

§§ 3(a)(13)-(14) of the 1934 Act.

Justice Powell also stated that when Congress did wish to include offers, it did so
expressly, as in § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), the antifraud provision of the

1933 Act.
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Court's] traditions and the intent of the securities laws," 54 Justice
Blackmun stated that the proper test for a valid rule lOb-5 claim
should be the showing of a logical nexus between the alleged fraud
and the sale or purchase of a security. Understanding the word "sale"
to mean a generalized event of public disposal of property, the dissent
reasoned that a plaintiff need not be an actual purchaser or seller in
order to have standing under Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Justice
Blackmun found support for such an interpretation in the legislative
history of the Act, particularly that of Section 10(b).5 5 He distin-

guished the factual situation in Birnbaum from that in Blue Chip and
found the practical difficulties cited by the majority 56 as requiring the
application of Birnbaum to be an insufficient reason for denying relief
57
to many deserving plaintiffs.

54. 421 U.S. at 762. In addition, he cited five previous opinions of the Court which
contain liberal interpretations of various provisions of the securities laws. Such interpretations intimated that the Supreme Court would not follow Birnbaum. See Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (Court interpreted rule lOb-5
broadly to impose liability upon persons who had profited by acting as brokers to sell
Indians' stock without full disclosure to sellers); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (Court held that rule 10b-5 prohibited fraud
upon a corporation as well as upon individuals and in face-to-face transactions as well
as in organized securities markets); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 463
(1969) (merger preventing stockholder from being able to sell his stock in old corporation constituted a sale for purposes of rule lOb-5); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967) (in defining "security," the Court held that the securities acts constituted remedial legislation and should be construed broadly); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (Congress intended the statute to be
construed like other securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,
not technically and restrictively but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes). Justices Blackmun and Brennan also dissented in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct.
1375 (1976) (Justice Douglas had retired). The basis of the dissent in Ernst was
again that the securities acts constitute remedial legislation and should be broadly interpreted. See 96 S. Ct. at 1392.
55. One of the principal draftsmen of the House version of the bill (which is substantially the same as the final Act) said of § 9(c) (which became § 10):
Subsection (c) says, "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices."
• . . Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices ....
Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Conmm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
56. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
57. Justice Blackmun made no attempt to define "deserving plaintiff." In Blue
Chip, plaintiffs case had more creditibility than would be the situation in most actions
for fraudulent dissuasion, as plaintiff was a member of a well-defined group to which
the stock offering was made.
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III.

THE TRIUMPH OF BIRNBAUM

Although most of the actions brought under rule lOb-5 could be
brought under state corporation law, the 10b-5 action is extremely
attractive to plaintiffs for- two reasons. First, since the action is
brought in federal court, the liberal federal rules of procedure apply.
Discovery, jurisdiction, venue, and service of process are thus facilitated. A plaintiff can, of course, file his claim in federal court and
make use of federal procedure in a diversity action, but it is often difficult to attain complete diversity, particularly as the corporation is a
citizen of both the state of its incorporation and the state of its principal place of business. 58 Secondly, the use of federal procedure will
not avoid the application of substantive state law in a diversity action. 59 Most state corporation acts require the proof of common law
fraud as opposed to the fraud encompassed in rule lOb-5, which until
recently amounted to little more than "unfairness. ' 60 Further, the
Supreme Court has held that plaintiff need not prove that he relied on
defendant's statements. 61 Perhaps most importantly, most states require the posting of a security bond, which is often prohibitive in
amount, as a condition of maintaining a derivative suit. 62 Such suits
make up a great portion of the litigation in this area.
These differences in both substantive and procedural law have led
to an understandable desire on the part of plaintiffs to bring their actions under rule 1Ob-5.63 Two policy considerations, however, support the Birnbaum court's desire to prevent a broad class of plaintiffs
from taking advantage of lOb-5. First, the substantive part of the
58.

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970).

59.

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

60. See I A. BROMBERG, SEcuRITIEs LAW: FRAUD § 1.1 (1975), for the view that
rule lOb-5 requires little more than "unfairness." This has been substantially altered,
however, by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S.
Ct. 1375 (1976), which held that plaintiff must establish the defendant's scienter in
order to prevail under rule lOb-5. The Court did, however, reserve the question as to
whether recklessness would be sufficient to state a claim. See note_13 supra.
61. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
62. See 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.7 (1975). See, e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE § 23A.08.460 (1974), providing that where plaintiff holds less than 5% of
the outstanding shares of any class of stock, unless such shares held have value in excess of $25,000, the corporation is entitled to have plaintiff give security for reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, that may be incurred by it in connection with
such action.
63. This desire will be somewhat lessened by the Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), requiring specific intent as a basis for a lOb-5
action. See note 13 supra.
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Birnbaum rule 64 was motivated by a belief that Congress did not intend to supplant all state law dealing with corporate fiduciary duties
when it passed the securities acts. 6 5 Secondly, the standing portion of
the Birnbaum rule 66 was motivated by a recognition of the dangers of
strike suits, which would have free play if a means of dismissing such
67
suits before trial were not available.
Over the years both parts of the rule have been broadened, 68 but
the standing portion of the rule has remained a significant obstacle to
many plaintiffs. In the vast majority of cases the standing rule is a
good one. It excludes many actions that might be brought where
plaintiff complains that he would have bought stock which later increased in value but for defendant's gloomy representations which
plaintiff may have seen in a prospectus or through the communications media. 69 There would be little evidence other than plaintiffs oral
assertions to show that he had actually been influenced by defendant's
representations and to show when and how much he would have purchased. While such a case would likely fail for want of evidence at
trial, its nuisance effect would probably be sufficient to give it settlement value; funds for settlement come, of course, out of the corporate
earnings. The general validity of the rule, however, should not obscure the fact that it will occasionally result in a dismissal of a valid
claim if inflexibly construed. The Supreme Court in Blue Chip treated
Birnbaum in just such an inflexible manner in a factual situation
where plaintiff might have been able to establish a valid claim.
A.

The Omissions by the Majority

Three important lines of analysis were either ignored or inadequately considered by the Blue Chip Court, thereby resulting in considerable ambiguity as to its holding. First, the Court should have de64. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
65. This belief is supported by § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1970), which provides that federal remedies supplement state remedies.
66. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
67. For a discussion of the settlement value of such "strike suits," see note 48 and
accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 23 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
69. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969), a corporation was held liable to all those shareholders who sold their
stock after the company had issued a misleading pessimistic press release about its
mining exploration in Canada.
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lineated and considered the substantive portion of Birnbaum apart
from its standing aspect. Secondly, the Court should have given serious consideration to the creation of an exception to Birnbaum in the
case of a securities offering pursuant to an antitrust decree. Thirdly,
the Court should have devoted greater analysis to the types of plaintiffs who will be allowed to sue under lb-5 after Blue Chip.
1.

A delineation of the substantive requirement

There was no allegation of internal corporate mismanagement in
Blue Chip; therefore, the substantive part of the Birnbaum rule was
not directly involved. In view of the considerable confusion that has
resulted from the mixing of the substantive doctrine and the standing
rule, both by the courts70 and the commentators,71 the Court should
have clearly distinguished the two and addressed them separately. A
ruling by the Court upon the present status of the substantive requirement was necessary to eliminate the confusion in the federal courts
over the continuing validity of the standing rule. It was due to a belief
that the substantive doctrine was the only true holding of Birnbaum
that the court in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.7 2 rejected the standing requirement as being a false interpretation of the
case.
The Eason court concluded that the purchaser-seller limitation was
only a description of the Birnbaum court's understanding of the class
70. Of particular note are the Second Circuit opinion denying recovery because
plaintiff was not a purchaser or seller (the standing doctrine) and the Supreme Court's
reversal because lOb-5 extends its protection to private securities transactions as well

as to those conducted on the stock exchanges (the substantive doctrine). Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 6
(1971).
71. At least four writers have completely failed to make any distinction between
the substantive and standing parts of the rule. See Boone & McGowan, Standing To
Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEX. L. REV. 617 (1971); Fuller, Another Demise of
the Birnbaum Doctrine: "Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?", 25 MIAMI L. REv. 131
(1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5,
54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule

10b-5 Reevaluated, 44 COLO. L. Rav. 151 (1972). One other observer has taken the
view that the two doctrines have merged. See Note, Standing To Sue in l0b-5 Actions:
Eason v. GMAC and Its Impact on the Birnbaum Doctrine, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.

1131 (1974). Bromberg believes that the Supreme Court's decision in Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), dealt the death blow to the
substantive doctrine, 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.7(522) (1975), but

nowhere does the Court explicitly acknowledge this.
72. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1975).
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of persons protected by rule lOb-5. Such a position is not unreasonable if one acknowledges the factual distinctions between Birnbaum
and a typical securities transaction on an exchange. 73 The Birnbaum
opinion conveys the impression that the principal reason for the
court's rejection of the claim in Birnbaum was that plaintiffs were not
members of the class for whose benefit the statute was passed, since
they were asking for damages for corporate mismanagement rather
than seeking redress from fraud in a securities transaction. This interpretation was seemingly further buttressed when the Supreme Court
said in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
that it agreed that Section 10(b) was not directed at internal corporate
mismanagement but rather at deceptive devices in the purchase or sale
of securities. 74 Due to repeated citation of Birnbaum as authority for
the purchaser-seller limitation in later cases, however, its rule has become known as a rule of standing,7 5 and its substantive holding has
been largely ignored. The Blue Chip Court continued this policy of
sidestepping the substantive requirement. While the Court's holding
clearly rejects the Eason approach,7 6 it is not clear what is the present
status of the substantive doctrine. It may have continued validity,
though in a more liberalized form, 77 or it may have ceased to exist
altogether.
2.

An exception to the standing rule

The Court did not seriously consider the possibility of creating an
exception to the standing rule in the case of stock offerings pursuant
73. Birnbaum involved the corporation president's breach of his fiduciary duty to
the minority shareholders in his sale of control of the company. It is not at all clear
that Congress intended § 10(b) to reach such activity. See note 18 supra. It is clear
that Congress intended to provide a remedy for misrepresentation in the sale of securities. Recently the Second Circuit court in Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir.
1972), required an allegation of a breach of defendant's duty to inform and disclose
in order to state a IOb-5 cause of action.
74. The Court said:
We agree that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which
constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement. But we read § 10(b)
to mean that Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and contrivances in the
purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized markets or face
to face.
404 U.S. at 12 (1971).
75. Many commentators fail even to acknowledge the existence of the substantive
doctrine. See note 71 supra.
76. The Eason approach should be rejected, as it does not deal with the problem
at which the Birnbaum rule is primarily aimed-nuisance suits.
77. See note 18 supra.
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to an antitrust decree. In failing to do so, the Court did not decide the
case on the facts before it. The court of appeals had allowed the complaint by fashioning an exception to Birnbaum in the case of sales
pursuant to an antitrust consent decree. The Supreme Court, however,
gave only the most cursory consideration to the possibility of such an
exception to the rule.7 8 It concluded, based perhaps in part upon a too
credulous reading of petitioner's brief,79 that the circuit court's decision amounted to a complete rejection of Birnbaum. The Court's reaction was the imposition of the purchaser-seller limitation in toto. 80
This result was surprising in light of several of the Court's prior
opinions which had liberally interpreted the scope of other provisions
of the securities acts. In Tcherepnin v. Knight 81 when the Court was
called upon to define the word "security" for the purpose of the acts,
it observed that the Securities Exchange Act was remedial legislation
which should be interpreted broadly to effectuate its purpose. 82 It further noted that form should be disreparded for substance and the
78. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
79. Petitioners argued that the Ninth Circuit decision effectively overthrew the
purchaser-seller doctrine and that it could not be limited to the facts of this case. Brief
for Petitioner at 23, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Petitioner based its argument upon the finding of the court of appeals that the principal reason for the purchaser-seller rule was that if plaintiff has neither bought nor
sold the securities in question, his claim must fail for want of proof as to loss and
causation. Since the court of appeals could find no difficulties of proof where the proposed sale was pursuant to an antitrust consent decree, it allowed the claim. Thus, the
circuit court's reasoning is limited to those situations where the only possible purchaser, the price of the proposed sale, the time of the transfer, and most important,
the number of shares involved in the proposed sale are clearly ascertainable and not
subject to speculation.
80. That the Court should choose to write such an extreme opinion in this case is
particularly surprising in light of its denial of certiorari, 416 U.S. 960 (1975), only a
few months before to Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th
Cir. 1973), in which the standing doctrine was rejected. Assuming that the Court
wished to affirm Birnbaum wholeheartedly, a reversal of Eason would hjve been perhaps a more appropriate way to do so rather than reversal of the Ninth Circuit exception to the rule in Blue Chip.
81. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
82. The full text of the Court's statement was as follows:
In addition, we are guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that
remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. The
Securities Exchange Act quite clearly falls into the category of remedial legislation.
One of its central purposes is to protect investors through the requirement of full
disclosure by issuers of securities .... Finally, we are reminded that, in searching
for the meaning and scope of the word "security" in the Act, form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality.
Id. at 336 (footnote omitted).
The Court, however, rejected the liberal approach suggested by the Knight case when
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), was argued by the SEC. The
Court found that each section of the Act was carefully tailored to provide a certain
remedy and should not be stretched beyond that role. See note 13 supra.
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emphasis should be on "economic reality." This language seemed to
foreshadow a retreat from an arbitrary interpretation of the Birnbaum
rule or at least a willingness to make liberal exceptions to the rule
when advisable in accordance with equitable considerations. More
recently, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,8 3 the Court indicated that a broad view of the scope of Section 10 and rule lob-5
84
should be taken.
The Blue Chip majority, however, found that to agree with the
court of appeals would leave the Birnbaum rule open to endless caseby-case erosion, depending upon whether or not a particular group of
plaintiffs was sufficiently discrete to justify an exception to the rule.
The majority concluded that "such a shifting and highly fact-oriented
disposition of the issue [was not] a satisfactory basis for a rule of liability imposed on the conduct of business transactions. ' 85 Consistency
in decisionmaking is very important in the area of commercial liability, particularly in interpretation of contracts. One can only write a
contract with confidence if he knows how the courts will interpret the
language used. This is not true, however, of a rule of standing for
bringing a securities fraud action. Any uncertainty created here will
only have the salutary effect of deterring fraud. The creation of such a
limited exception in an area where the seller is peculiarly likely to
engage in fraud to dissuade the buyer from purchasing would not lead
to any of the practical difficulties suggested by the Court.8 6 Nor is the

83. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
84. The Court particularly emphasized the liberality with which the statute should
be construed in order to effect its purpose:
These proscriptions, by statute and rule, are broad and, by repeated use of the
word "any," are obviously meant to be inclusive. The Court has said that the 1934
Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace a "'fundamental purpose
. . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 . . . (1963). In
the case just cited the Court noted that Congress intended securities legislation
enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed "not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 195 ....
This was recently said once again in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 . . . (1971).
Id. at 151 (footnote omitted).
Again, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), the Court rejected the
liberality of this approach. Blue Chip and Ernst taken together suggest that in the
future the Court will strictly construe the securities acts.
85. 421 U.S. at 755.
86. Where the parties, time, price, and amount of securities involved in the aborted
transaction are beyond dispute, as in Blue Chip, plaintiffs chances of prevailing upon
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langauge of the Act or the rule so clear as to force the Court to refuse
to hear the case. 87 The primary purpose of the Act was to promote
honest disclosure of material facts. That purpose would be well served
by allowing such an action under these circumstances.
3.

An analysis of potentialplaintiffs

The majority's analysis of the plaintiffs potentially excluded by the
Birnbaum rule is inadequate. 88 The Court initially noted that the rule
will exclude all potential purchasers who have been dissuaded from
purchasing by an allegedly fraudulent prospectus. In general, such
exclusion is valid, but in some cases such as Blue Chip, where plaintiff
can prove his allegations with written documents, the rule becomes
overly exclusive. The position of actual shareholders who have been
fraudulently dissuaded from selling is endangered as well. Though
some potential plaintiffs in this category may be able to obtain relief
through stockholder's derivative actions, other stockholders may find
a derivative action insufficient to provide a remedy when interests protected by the statute are violated. For instance, derivative action
cannot be used where plaintiff holds stock in a corporation which no
longer exists due to merger, 89 nor will it operate where the fraud is
upon the individual plaintiff and not upon a corporation. 90 Lastly, the
the merits are good (and thus any settlement value justified), and there are no "hazy
issues of fact" to be resolved by oral testimony. In Blue Chip, plaintiff was clearly an

offeree of a limited securities offering. This is very different from the case where a
plaintiff claims to have been fraudulently dissuaded from purchasing in a general
securities offering and can put forward no evidence other than his own statement that
he ever really considered buying.
87. The legislative history of the Act and the rule indicates a desire for both a
breadth of coverage, see notes 24 & 55 supra, which is inconsistent with the purchaser-

seller limitation, and for a specificity of language in § 10(b) and other sections of the
Act, see note 53 supra, which is consistent with the limitation.
88.
89.

421 U.S. at 737.
See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.

970 (1967).
90.

See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), where plaintiff

stockbroker purchased securities for defendants, who refused to pay him for the stock
when its price went down. The ordering of stock with intent to refuse to pay in the
event of a decline in price was found to be a manipulative or deceptive device within

the meaning of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Under a broad, pre-Blue Chip interpretation
of Birnbaum, the court found that plaintiff broker's subsequent sale of the stock gave
him standing to sue under lOb-5, in spite of the fact that his injury was caused not by
that sale, but by the previous refusal of defendants to purchase. Note that derivative
action would have been useless, as there had been no fraud upon the corporation

(which stands as plaintiff in a derivative action) but only upon the individual broker.
In Thompson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 111
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Court noted that the Birnbaum rule will exclude actions by shareholders and creditors who have suffered loss due to fraudulent insider
activity with respect to securities. If the substantive portion of the rule
is still valid, such plaintiffs are properly excluded under rule lOb-5.
The Securities Exchange Act was not designed to provide a remedy
for corporate mismanagement and even the broadest interpretation of
Birnbaum would not encompass all such claims. 9 '
B.

The Results of Blue Chip

In order to establish firmly the Birnbaum rule, the Court dealt
harshly 92 with plaintiff Manor Drug Stores, which had alleged precisely the type of fraud that Congress intended to prevent in requiring
full disclosure in prospectuses. Although the purchaser-seller limitation is generally a good one,93 no rule should be applied with such
rigid formalism that the implication is inescapable that there are no
exceptions. 94 A well-developed rule has many exceptions in order to
deal with some of the more difficult cases. 95 Such exceptions to the
(W.D. Okla. 1975). plaintiff was induced by misrepresentation to hold stock which
declined in value. The court. relying on Blue Chip, dismissed the claim.
91.
See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934). See also Popkin v.
Bishop. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has been the leading court in expanding the Birnbaum rule. But see Marshel v. AFW
Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
92, "There is a 'throw the baby out with the bath water' result-by enshrining the
buyer-seller requirement as one of standing rather than a factor bearing on the quantum of proof or the need for . . . other devices to prevent abusive suits." 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.8, at 424 (Supp. 1975).

93. Generally if there has been no purchase or sale, one has only plaintiffs word
for what he would have done, "had he known." Such a basis for a claim is too speculative to be taken seriously and has been consistently rejected. See Mount Clemens
Indus., Inc. v. Bell. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972) (claim dismissed because nonpurchasing plaintiff failed to show that no other purchaser could have bought before he
would have, had he not been dissuaded from buying by defendant's fraudulent statements).
94. Bromberg notes that the opinion amounts to "a return to a restrictive tone and
mode of reasoning that was common in lOb-5 cases in the 1950s but has almost
wholly disappeared since." 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.8. at 424

(Supp. 1975).
95. Kenneth Davis makes an analogous argument in the area of administrative
law:
We must reject the false ideal of a government of laws and not of men. What we
have and what we have to have is a government of laws and of men. We cannot
accomplish the main objectives of modern government without significant discretionary power. No legal system in world history has been without such power.
None can be. Discretion is essential for individualized justice, for creative justice,
for new programs in which no one yet knows how to formulate rules, and for old
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Birnbaum rule were evolving, but unfortunately these varied in
phrasing and underlying policy among the several circuit courts. In
Blue Chip the Supreme Court had an opportunity to standardize
policy and terminology in the area and accept those exceptions to the
rule which furthered its objectives.
Instead, the Blue Chip Court did not consider any of the cases creating exceptions to the Birnbaum rule, leaving the present standing
rule quite vague-something the Court claimed to avoid. Its wholehearted acceptance of Birnbaum casts doubt upon those cases where
the lower courts had modified the purchaser-seller limitation so as to
find a deserving plaintiff within the rule.9 6 The Supreme Court might
be willing to accept those interpretations as none of the courts claimed
to be finding an exception to the rule as such.9 7 The validity of the
"forced seller" doctrine, however, is in considerable doubt.
C.

The "Developed Rule" Alternative

The crucial requirement of a rule of standing in this area is to provide a test which will admit all valid claims and exclude all nuisance
or "strike" suits on summary judgment. Although no test would perform this function perfectly, the purchaser-seller limitation could be
quite effective if flexibly applied. Exceptions to the rule should be
allowed in those cases where plaintiff has some sort of documentary
evidence of the time, amount, and price of his proposed purchase or
programs in which some aspects cannot be reduced to rules.
K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIWE LAw TEXT § 4.02, at 92-93 (3d ed. 1972).

Other examples of well-developed rules which have recognized exceptions are the

hearsay rule, see MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE .§§ 244-327 (2d ed. 1972), and the parol

evidence rule, which has an exception in the case of fraud. See, e.g., Lusk Corp. v.
Burgess, 85 Ariz. 90, 332 P.2d 493 (1958); Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 143
N.E.2d 906, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1957).

96. Bromberg notes that aborted purchases and sales will not provide a basis upon
which to maintain a cause of action but concludes that nothing seems to prevent parties to a contract or forced buyers or sellers from suing. 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAW: FRAUD § 8.8 (Supp. 1975). As forced buyers and sellers have not actually pur-

chased or sold under the present meaning of the "forced" concept, their position is
quite tenuous. Note,7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 602 (1975).
97. This seems to have been the mistake of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Blue Chip-to actually admit that it was making an exception to the rule.
Certainly any-future-plaintiff shoulf-a least claim to fall squarely within Birnbaum,

no matter how outlandish that claim may be, rather than ask the court to make an
exception in his case. Unfortunately this creates a system in which a close case will
turn much more on the niceties of language used by counsel in the briefs than upon
the substance of the claim.
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sale. Such a "developed rule" would recognize exceptions for "forced
sellers," suits in equity, and for those transactions which are pursuant
to an antitrust decree. As rule lOb-5 is a "catchall" provision,9 8 relief
should be as broad as possible consistent with avoiding strike suits.
Although the substantive requirement has been considerably liberalized in order to allow for federal jurisdiction in all cases where securities are significantly involved, the requirement should prohibit 10b-5
consideration of claims which allege only corporate mismanagement
and only incidentally involve securities. Congress never intended that
Section 10(b) supersede state law on corporate fiduciary relationships. 99
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court seemingly did not approach the Blue Chip case
with a view to establishing the best rule for future cases. The majority
and dissent both took extreme stances and engaged in a battle of polemics without ever considering the possibility that the best rule lay in
some middle ground. Arguments based upon the language of the
statute and the intent of the Congress exist on both sides and are inconclusive. Such an impasse suggests that the Court should look to the
policy reasons underlying the statute for guidance in the creation of
an equitable rule. The Blue Chip Court correctly identified the policy
of preventing strike suits as demanding some form of the purchaserseller limitation, but in failing to give equal recognition to its earlier
announced policy of broad relief for fraud involving securities, t00 it
erred in announcing an overly restrictive rule.
Douglass A. North

98. See note 55 supra. Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are the only provisions of the
securities acts and regulations which are not directed at any specific group that plays a
role in securities issuance and transfer. The section and rule apply to "any person."
99. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970), specifically provides that federal remedies are to supplement state remedies. See also S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934).
100. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), the Court similarly
rejected its earlier policy of broad relief under the securities acts. Blue Chip and Ernst
seem to mark a new departure from liberality in the Court's interpretation of the
securities acts.
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